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CORPORATE OWNERSHIP OF THE FARM RESIDENCE
— by Neil E. Harl*
For farmers and ranchers considering incorporating, one of the
major questions is whether the farm or ranch residence or
residences should be transferred to the newly formed corporation.1
From an income tax perspective, residential costs are deductible
for an unincorporated taxpayer only to the extent of mortgage
interest2 and property taxes3 and costs associated with business
use of the residence such as an office "used regularly and on an
exclusive basis" for business purposes.4
Deductibility of costs .  For the residence as a business
asset, all of the costs associated with the residence are income tax
deductible for C corporations.5  For residences owned by S corpo-
rations and occupied by a shareholder, in general, deductions are
allowed only to the extent the residence is used regularly and on
an exclusive basis for business purposes.6
Taxability of benefits.  The greatest concern with
corporate ownership of the residence is taxability of the benefits
of shareholder occupancy.  Those occupying corporate-owned
residences have three choices — (1) pay a reasonable rental to the
corporation for the right of occupancy, (2) report the value of
occupancy as additional income as compensation7 or as a dividend
or (3) rely upon the section of the Internal Revenue Code
providing that meals and lodging furnished to an employee for the
convenience of the employer do not constitute taxable income to
the recipient.8  Another possibility, but one of very narrow
applicability, is that the value of individual occupancy may be
treated as a gift.9
For the value of lodging to be excluded, three tests must be
met — (1) the lodging must be furnished on the business
premises of the employer,10 (2) the lodging must be furnished
for the convenience of the employer and (3) the employee must
be required to accept the lodging on the premises as a condition of
employment.11  The latter test means that the employee must be
required to accept the lodging to enable the employee properly to
perform the duties of employment.12  This test is met if the
lodging is furnished because the employee is required to be
available for duty at all times or if the employee could not
perform the services required of the employee without the
lodging.13  In a 1987 letter ruling, the value of housing provided
by the employer was included in the employee's income where
the housing was not provided at the work site but was scattered
within   housing   generally   available  to  the  public.14   Thus,
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housing provided in a nearby town is not eligible for the
exclusion.
What about the need for an employee of a farm corporation to
be on the premises at all times for livestock observation and
periodic chores or for equipment security, crop drying and other
tasks associated with a cropping operation?  A pair of 1938 U.S.
District Court cases allowed the exclusion for the value of living
quarters provided to pineapple plantation managers15 but a 1948
Tax Court case held that the rental value of a corporate-owned
farm house occupied by a sole shareholder was taxable income to
the occupant.16  A 1966 Tax Court decision held that the benefits
inuring to the president of a poultry breeding corporation from
living in a house provided by the corporation adjacent to the
corporation's poultry farm was taxable income.17  In another
1966 case, Wilhelm v. U.S.,18 the value of food and lodging
provided by a ranching corporation was not taxed to the
shareholder-employees.  A board of director resolution had
required residency and meal consumption on the ranch premises
by all employees.  In holding for the taxpayer, the court
emphasized the distance from the nearest town (24-26 miles).19
In Caratan v. Comm'r,20 a 1971 case, the Commissioner was
not sustained in adding $1200 to the gross income of each share-
holder-employee of a closely-held farm corporation who lived in a
corporation-owned house on the business premises.  In that case,
a 10-minute drive was required to reach alternate housing. The
taxpayers met the burden of proving that the lodging furnished to
them was indispensable to the proper discharge of their
employment.21
In one of two 1985 cases, J. Grant Farms, Inc. v. Comm'r22
the value of lodging and the cost of utilities of a farm manager-
sole shareholder and family were held to be excludable from the
manager's income because the manager's residence on the farm
was necessary and a condition of employment in the swine
raising and crop operation involving grain drying.  In the other
1985 case, Johnson v. Comm'r,23 the husband and wife, sole
shareholders in a corporation, were allowed to exclude the fair
rental value of a corporation-owned residence located on the
premises.  The husband was manager of the corporation's grain
drying and storing operation.
Scope of term "lodging."  The term "lodging" includes
such items as heat, electricity, gas, water and sewer service unless
the employee contracts for the utilities directly from the sup-
plier.24  Thus, amounts for gas and electricity paid by a corpora-
tion in a grain and dairy operation were necessary for the
residences to be habitable and so were excludable from incomes of
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the employees.25  If the employee is required to pay for the
utilities without reimbursement from the employer, the utilities
are not excludable from income.26
Supporting resolution.  If it is intended for the require-
ments to be met for employees to exclude the fair rental value of
a corporate-owned residence from income, it is advisable for the
corporation's board of directors to adopt a resolution requiring
corporate employees to reside on the premises.27
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
ANTITRUST
PRICE FIXING.  The plaintiffs
were sellers of feeder cattle who sold cattle
to the defendant meat packers.  As a guide
for setting prices to be paid to cattle
sellers, the defendants used a publication
called the Yellow Sheet which published
the previous day's prices.  The court relied
upon the law of the case established in a
similar suit by the plaintiffs against meat
retailers who also used the Yellow Sheet
to establish prices paid to the meat
packers.  In re Beef Industry Antitrust
Litigation, 542 F. Supp. 1122 (N.D. Tex.
1982), aff'd 710 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).  Under
the first case, the court found that the use
of the Yellow Sheet was only one of
several factors used to establish meat
prices.  In the current case, the court held
that the plaintiffs produced insufficient
evidence of similar pricing by the
defendants.  The plaintiffs also alleged that
the defendants acquired monopoly (one
seller) power over boxed beef sales and
monopsony (one buyer) power in the fed
cattle procurement market.  However, the
plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants
misused their power as oligopsonists
(market of dominant buyers).  The court
held that the plaintiffs produced insuffi-
cient evidence of market control by the
defendants to support either theory and that
the evidence under one theory tended to
negate the evidence supporting the other
theory.  In re  Beef Industry
Antitrust Litigation, 907 F.2d
510 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'g 713 F .
Supp. 971 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
DISCHARGE.  A claim for state em-
ployment taxes owed by the debtor on
wages earned by employees more than 90
days before the filing of bankruptcy was
held dischargeable.  In re  Pierce, 1 1 5
B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Tex .
1990) .
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor was not
allowed to exempt the debtor's interest in
an IRA under the Connecticut exemption
for "profit sharing, pension, stock bonus,
annuity or similar plan."  Matter o f
Spandorf, 115 B.R. 415 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1990).
The debtors were shareholders in a cor-
poration which held title to their resi-
dences.  The corporation was involuntarily
dissolved many years before the debtors
filed for bankruptcy and claimed their
interests in the residences as exempt.
Although the debtors did not take any
action to revest title to the residences in
themselves, the assets of the corporation
revested in the sole shareholder in the
corporation by law upon the dissolution;
therefore, the debtors owned interests in
the residences which were eligible for the
exemption.  In re  Morris, 115 B . R .
626 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1990).
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS.
The debtors fed cattle belonging to another
person and sold the cattle after the cattle
reached a certain weight.  The proceeds of
the sales were then sent to the owner who
returned the amount to be paid for the
feeding.  The court held that the payment
of the sales proceeds within 90 days before
the bankruptcy filing were not preferential
transfers because the cattle and proceeds
never belonged to the debtors.  In re
Zwagerman, 115 B.R. 540 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1990).
